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In March 2012, the government of Greece defaulted on approximately €200 billion (about $265 
billion) of its bonded debt, the largest sovereign default in recorded history and the first by an 
advanced country boasting an annual income per capita exceeding $25,000 and membership of 
the very wealthy European Union.1  
The default was precipitated by persistently negative attitudes being displayed by the authorities 
in Berlin which ultimately destroyed the confidence of the credit rating agencies and fixed-
income investors which had been funding the Greek government. The subsequent debt 
restructuring, which imposed all-in losses on bond holders in excess of 70% on a net-present-
value (NPV) basis, placed Greece in the same company with Argentina and Ecuador – serial 
defaulters which had likewise inflicted up-front losses of a similar magnitude on their creditors.2  
In each of these three cases (to a greater or lesser extent), the sovereign debt workout was driven 
largely by considerations of a non-economic nature, with creditor rights and the rule of law being 
trampled.3 Moreover, we argue that the scale of the losses imposed by the government of Greece 
under pressure from its eurozone partners and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was based 
on questionable estimates and judgments. It is no wonder that the Greek default and restructuring 
set a troubling precedent that has been worrying investors involved in other vulnerable countries 
around Europe’s periphery ever since. 
                                                          
1 Greece had previously defaulted in 1932, as other countries in Europe and most in Latin America had done in the midst of the 
Great Depression. See Carmen M Reinhart and Kenneth S Rogoff, This Time Is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2009), p 96. The world’s second-largest default was staged by Argentina beginning in late 
2001, and it involved about $80 billion of bondholder debt plus several billion more in obligations to official and various other 
private sector creditors.  
2 Juan J Cruces and Christoph Trebesch, “Sovereign Defaults: The Price of Haircuts”, draft, March 2012, p 36. The authors 
summarize various alternative calculations of investor NPV losses generated by them and other experts, finding that they 
average 74% for Argentina and 68% for Ecuador. The Greek restructuring involved a 53.5% reduction in the nominal face value 
of existing government bonds held by private investors, but considering the payment terms of the new bonds issued to 
investors after this ‘haircut’ was applied and prevailing market conditions, the debt exchange imposed an NPV loss of over 70%. 
See Credit Suisse, “Greece’s Debt Exchange”, February 27 2012, which estimated a 74% NPV loss, and Morgan Stanley, “On the 
Greek Debt Restructuring, Part I”, February 22 2012, which estimated a 73%-78% NPV haircut. 
3 For more on Argentina, see Arturo C Porzecanski, “From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: Implications of Argentina’s 
Default”, Chicago Journal of International Law, Summer 2005. For more on Ecuador, see Arturo C Porzecanski, “When Bad 
Things Happen to Good Sovereign Debt Contracts: The Case of Ecuador”, Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall 2010. 
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1. The Greek tragedy 
1.1 Act I 
The pedestrian version of the story of the Greek financial crisis and default is that the country 
was fiscally mismanaged for a long time and failed to carry out needed structural reforms that 
could have improved economic growth prospects and enhanced the country’s creditworthiness. A 
default and debt restructuring were therefore inevitable sooner or later—and certainly so once 
the financial markets were informed, as happened in October 2009, that prior governments had 
underestimated their budget deficit and public debt figures. This prosaic tale of the supposed 
inevitability of the Greek tragedy has been endorsed, for example, by a prominent economic 
historian: “Since independence in the 1830s, Greece has been in a state of default about 50% of 
the time. Does that tell you something?”4 
In reality, Greece’s road to default and debt restructuring in 2012 was not at all 
straightforward—and there was no historical inevitability about it, either. Consider some of the 
facts. In the last five decades, successive governments in Greece managed its public finances 
without a hitch, including servicing a very high level of public debt that averaged the equivalent 
of nearly 100% of GDP from 1990 until 2009.5 In 2009, the public debt was structured very 
favorably: the average interest rate on the debt was a low 4.2% per annum, and its weighted-
average residual maturity was eight years, the second-longest among advanced economies (after 
the United Kingdom).6 It is difficult to argue that this exceedingly benign debt structure in 
Greece was the poisoned fruit of moral hazard; after all, the European Union enshrined a well-
known prohibition on bailing out its members, designed to protect it from shouldering the cost of 
fiscal indiscipline in any one country, thereby encouraging bond holders to assess and bear the 
risk of any potential default and restructuring.7 
It is true that Greece raised eyebrows in October 2009, when an incoming government 
announced that the fiscal deficit for 2008 had been revised from the equivalent of 5% to 7.7% of 
GDP, and that because of an election-related drop in tax revenues and a splurge in fiscal 
                                                          
4 “Q&A: Carmen Reinhart on Greece, US Debt and Other ‘Scary Scenarios,’ “Wall Street Journal Blogs, February 5 2010. Greece 
was in default throughout much of the 19th century. The flippant view expressed is reminiscent of skeptical attitudes among 
academics toward Mexico’s financial crises at the end of seemingly every six-year presidential term—at least until a dozen years 
ago, that is, when Mexico ‘outgrew’ them. 
5 IMF, Historical Public Debt Database, September 2011. The precise two-decade average was 99% of GDP. The government of 
Greece defaulted on its obligations during the Great Depression, as previously noted, and so did some 30 other governments 
around the world, more than a fifth of total sovereign issuers. The Greek default was finally cured in 1964. See Standard & 
Poor’s, “Sovereign Defaults at 26-Year Low, to Show Little Change in 2007”, September 18 2006. 
6 Average implicit interest rate calculated by the author from Eurostat, Government Finance Statistics, Summary Tables 1996–
2010, December 2011, p 13; maturity data from IMF, Fiscal Monitor, November 2010, pp. 27–32.  
7 Article 125 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, often referred to as the ‘no-bailout clause’ of the 
Maastricht Treaty ratified in 1992, states that the EU and any of its member states “shall not be liable for or assume the 
commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of another member state, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific 
project”. European Union, “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union”, Official Journal of 
the European Union, C-83/99, March 30 2010. 
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spending, the deficit for 2009 would end up closer to 12.5% rather than 3.7% of GDP. (In the 
event, the actual figures for 2008-09 were 6.5% and 15.8% of GDP respectively.) It is also the 
case that the incoming prime minister promised at the time to impose austerity measures, but that 
he was short on both convincing detail and political support. 
However, Greece was the rule rather than the exception: every one of the 17 member countries 
of the eurozone experienced a major fiscal deterioration between 2007 and 2009 as a 
consequence of Europe’s economic downturn. While Greece’s fiscal deficit widened by 9.3 
percentage points of GDP during the two years, the fiscal position of the eurozone as a whole 
widened 5.7 percentage points. Britain’s own 2009 budget deficit was equivalent to 11.3% of 
GDP.8 
And largely because of the added fiscal cost of various bank bailout plans, the ratio of 
government debt to GDP increased by 13.5 percentage points in the whole of the eurozone 
between 2007 and 2009, and a more limited 5.6 percentage points in Greece. (In the United 
Kingdom, meanwhile, it jumped by more than 25 percentage points of GDP.) Among other 
heavily indebted countries in the eurozone, the ratio of debt to GDP went up as much as 11.8 
percentage points in Belgium and as little as 2.7 percentage points in Italy. The eurozone average 
debt-to-GDP ratio exceeded 87% in 2011, having measured 66% in 2007.9 
Figure 1: Selected fiscal indicators (percentages) 
 
Source: Eurostat and author’s calculations. 
                                                          
8 Unless otherwise stated, all fiscal data cited here and appearing in the Table reflects the author’s calculations from Eurostat, 
Government Finance Statistics, Summary Tables 1996–2010. 
9 Eurostat, Newsrelease 62/2012, April 23 2012, and Newsrelease 20/2012, February 6 2012. 
2007 2009 Change
Fiscal balance/GDP
Eurozone -0.7 -6.4 -5.7
Belgium -0.3 -5.8 -5.5
Italy -1.6 -5.4 -3.8
Greece -6.5 -15.8 -9.3
Govt. Debt/GDP
Eurozone 66.3 79.8 13.5
Belgium 84.1 95.9 11.8
Italy 103.1 105.8 2.7
Greece 107.4 113.0 5.6
Govt. Debt/Eurozone GDP
Belgium 3.1 3.7 0.6
Italy 17.7 19.7 2.0
Greece 2.6 3.4 0.8
Govt. Debt/Eurozone Govt. Debt
Belgium 4.7 4.6 -0.1
Italy 26.7 24.7 -2.0
Greece 4.0 4.2 0.2
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The news that the 2009 fiscal deficit in Greece would be much larger than previously projected 
actually did not lead to a measurable loss of investor confidence in Greece’s ability to refinance 
its debt and access new funds to cover ongoing deficits. Yields on Greek two-year and five-year 
benchmark government bonds were slightly lower in the five working days after, than in the five 
days prior to the October 20 announcement by George Papaconstantinou, then finance minister 
in the new Socialist government, that the budget deficit would be far higher than estimates 
provided by the former Conservative administration.10 
The erosion of investor confidence that would take place later on could have been prevented if 
Greece’s eurozone partners had seized the initiative and worked constructively with the new 
government in Athens to come up with a preemptive plan to introduce fiscal austerity and 
implement structural reforms that was backed by Europe and the IMF. After all, the public debt 
of Greece was minuscule by eurozone standards: it represented as of end-2009 a mere 3.4% of 
eurozone GDP, or 4.2% of total eurozone government debt.  
Early on then, Greece could have been stabilized—and for a fraction of what it has so far cost. 
Instead, initial hesitation in Athens on the part of Prime Minister George Papandreou, combined 
with inertia and indecision that gripped the eurozone in assembling a stabilization program for 
Greece until six months later, would plant the seed of doubt among the credit-rating agencies, 
market analysts, and investors—and not just about Greece’s fate, but also about the 
vulnerabilities of other countries sharing the single European currency. This is why a few months 
after Greece was provided with official funding, Portugal and Ireland also had to be supported by 
the EU and the IMF.11 In essence, Greece unwittingly played the role of the child in Hans 
Christian Andersen’s famous tale, pointing out that the eurozone “Emperor” was stark naked.12 
The slide in investor confidence in Greece began in December 2009, when all three of the 
leading rating agencies downgraded the sovereign (Fitch and Standard & Poor’s from A- to 
BBB+ and Moody’s from A1 to A2, all with a negative outlook). That fanned concerns that 
Greek government bonds would be excluded from ECB (European Central Bank) market 
operations when collateral credit-quality rules returned to pre-crisis levels at the end of 2010—
concerns that were aggravated in mid-January when President Jean-Claude Trichet said that the 
bank would not change its collateral policy for the sake of “any particular country.”13 (In the 
                                                          
10 Greek bond yield data courtesy of Bloomberg. “The news, delivered at a meeting of European Union finance ministers, was 
unpleasant but not unexpected for Greece’s 15 eurozone partners. They had suspected that the financial crisis would have a 
more serious impact on Greece’s deficit and debt than had been admitted in Athens.” See Tony Barber, “Greeks Aim to Cut 
Deficit”, Financial Times, October 21 2009. 
11 Domenico Lombardi, “The Euro-Area Crisis: Weighing Policy Options and the Scope for US Leverage”, US Senate 
Subcommittee on Security and International Trade and Finance Hearing, September 22 2011, p 2. 
12 This is a reference to serious flaws in the eurozone’s governance structure that have become obvious during the past few 
years as a result of the handling of the European banking and sovereign crises – and not only to the hesitant leadership of 
German chancellor Angela Merkel. For an incisive analysis, see Matthias Matthijs and Mark Blyth, “Why Only Germany Can Fix 
the euro”, Foreign Affairs Snapshots, November 17 2011. 
13 ECB press conference, January 14 2010. 
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event, the ECB would announce in late March that it was extending its emergency collateral 
rules into 2011, and in May it dropped all restrictions on Greek bonds to ensure they did not 
become ineligible after the country was downgraded to ‘junk’ level by Standard & Poor’s.) 
Yields on two-year Greek government bonds rose from below 2% in early December 2009 to a 
peak of 6.5% in early February 2010, before subsiding to around 5.5% later that month. 
Investor confidence was undermined again in April 2010 ahead of an agreement between Greece 
and the IMF, ECB, and European Commission—the so-called ‘Troika’—on an economic 
stabilization and reform plan backed by a joint European Union–IMF financing package worth 
€110 billion. Yields on two-year Greek government bonds increased from 4.5% in late March to 
above 18% in early May before dropping below 7% by mid-May, on the heels of both the 
financing package and news that the ECB would buy government and private debt in the biggest 
attempt yet to end the European financial crisis. The European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) was born, the region’s ‘temporary’ bailout mechanism, with an initial capital of €440 
billion. 
Another investor scare took place in mid-June 2010, when Moody’s concurred with Standard & 
Poor’s move in late April in likewise downgrading Greece’s government bond ratings to ‘junk’ 
(to Ba1 from A3), a level “which incorporates a greater, albeit, low risk of default.”14 Yields on 
two-year Greek government bonds rose from 7.5% to 10% prior to easing down to 9.5% in early 
July. There followed an additional, temporary loss of investor nerve in mid-August, but then the 
bond market calmed down, partly owing to praise from the IMF for Greece’s continuing effort to 
rein in its fiscal deficit. Yields on the two-year bonds fell to as low as 7.25% by mid-October. 
1.2 Act II 
What turned out to be the destruction of investor confidence on a permanent basis began on 
October 18 2010, when German Chancellor Merkel and French President Sarkozy met in 
Deauville (France) and agreed that private investors must ‘contribute’ to future European 
sovereign bailouts—a demand that was rightly interpreted as meaning that bond holders would 
have to accept adverse modifications to the payment terms on their securities. This would be the 
price of a deal to set up a larger, permanent bailout fund to replace the EFSF, because according 
to Merkel the current system of state-funded rescues had allowed for too much moral hazard to 
creep into the bond market. 
The financial markets were understandably roiled. In Greece, two-year bond yields jumped from 
7.25% back up above 10%. On November 4, the ECB’s Trichet expressed public concern that 
forcing bond holders to take losses would drive up borrowing costs. On November 12, seeking to 
calm the financial markets, the finance ministers of Europe’s five largest countries issued a 
statement clarifying that any private sector involvement (PSI) would not apply to any 
                                                          
14 Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Downgrades Greece to Ba1 from A3, Stable Outlook”, June 14 2010. 
6 
 
outstanding debt, and would only come into effect from 2013. However, irreparable damage to 
confidence was done.  
The following March (2011), Moody’s became the first of the major rating agencies to slash 
Greece down to single-B status, citing in part “the lack of certainty surrounding the precise 
nature and conditions of support that will be available to Greece after 2013, and its implications 
for bond holders.”15 It was followed by Standard & Poor’s and Fitch two months later, after the 
top European finance ministers gathered in Luxembourg (in May) to discuss further aid for 
Greece—but on condition that it would be accompanied by “sacrifices” made by private 
creditors. The ECB’s Trichet walked out, refusing to participate in any meeting that discussed 
such “haircuts.”16  
Figure 2: Greek government bond yields (percentage per annum) 
 
Source: Bloomberg and author’s calculations. 
 
Later that May, European finance ministers for the first time floated the idea of talks with bond 
holders to extend Greece’s debt repayment schedule. Two weeks later, Moody’s downgraded 
Greece to Caa1, consistent with a 50% probability of default, in part because of the likelihood 
that the Troika would “make the provision of financial assistance to Greece over the medium 
term conditional on a debt restructuring, in which private sector creditors would absorb some 
economic losses.”17 
In early June, Berlin proposed extending the maturities on Greek bonds by seven years. Within 
days, Standard & Poor’s responded by downgrading Greece to CCC, citing that “the risk of 
default … within the next 12 months has increased significantly”, and that in the event of a 
default, bond holders would recover only 30% to 50% of what they were owed.18 For his part, 
                                                          
15 Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Downgrades Greece to B1 from Ba1, Negative Outlook”, March 7 2011. 
16 Asked about the likelihood of a potential Greek default, Trichet said, “It is not in the cards.” Stephen Castle and Landon 
Thomas Jr., “Ministers Meet to Study Fixes on Greek Debt”, New York Times, May 6 2011. 
17 Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Downgrades Greece to Caa1 from B1, Negative Outlook”, June 1 2011. 
18 Standard & Poor’s, “Long-Term Sovereign Rating on Greece Cut to ‘CCC’; Outlook Negative”, June 13 2011. 
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Mario Draghi, incoming president of the ECB, warned against forcing private investors to take 
part: “All in all, the costs outweigh the benefits”, he said during his confirmation hearings.19  
As the IMF would admit in a July 2011 report, the very protracted public debate in Europe over 
this issue would take a heavy toll on Greece, not only by propelling bond yields ever higher, but 
by encouraging an exodus of bank deposits and also, via rating downgrades, by decreasing the 
value of Greek collateral with the ECB, necessitating banks to post additional collateral when 
they could least afford it. Systemic banking stress, in turn, was causing a major credit contraction 
and aggravating the country’s deepening recession.20 
Negotiations between Troika officials and some 40 mainly European banks represented by the 
Institute of International Finance (IIF) finally reached agreement on a bond exchange that would 
deliver financing to Greece of €54 billion from mid-2011 to mid-2014, and a total of €135 billion 
from mid-2011 to end-2020. It was a Brady Plan vintage 2011, involving the voluntary exchange 
of outstanding Greek bonds for par and discount bonds entailing an extension of maturities and 
either reduced coupons or principal forgiveness. Bonds maturing in 2030 would be fully 
collateralized and one maturing in 2015 would be partially collateralized. All instruments were to 
be priced to impose an NPV loss of 21%.21 Needless to say, the rating agencies responded 
promptly by cutting their assessments yet again (Moody’s to Ca, S&P to CC, and Fitch to CCC). 
1.3 Act III 
The ink was barely dry on this debt restructuring deal when its adequacy began to be questioned. 
The gloom about the future of the eurozone that became pervasive from August 2011 caused 
many officials to revise their economic forecasts (including for Greece) in a direction that 
suggested the debt relief on offer would be insufficient, the cost of purchasing collateral to back 
the new bonds would be too high, and the voluntary participation rate of creditors insufficient.22 
This led to a hardening of official attitudes and to an October demand that private creditors agree 
to a new plan entailing the forgiveness of at least half of what they were owed, with lowered 
coupons and no collateral backing. One of the (circular) arguments put forth was that since the 
prices of Greek bonds had plunged to about 36% of face value from 75% since the forging of the 
deal in July, the terms of the original deal were now too generous to bond holders.23 
There followed several months of negotiations between the Troika, Greece, and creditor 
representatives, but most time was taken up by various Troika-Greece economic and political 
issues. A confrontation between European leaders and Greek Prime Minister Papandreou over 
                                                          
19 Stephen Castle, “Mario Draghi Holds ECB Line against Restructuring for Greece”, New York Times, June 14 2011. 
20 IMF, “Greece: Fourth Review under the Stand-By Arrangement”, July 4 2011. 
21 IIF, “IIF Financing Offer”, July 21 2011. 
22 It was originally estimated that Greece would have to borrow €35 billion from eurozone member states to buy the AAA bonds 
needed to back the new securities to be created for the debt swap, but the intervening global rally in high-quality debt had 
made the intended bonds pricier, such that Greece would now need to borrow an extra €12 billion. See Landon Thomas Jr., 




his desire to submit the latest austerity and financing plan to a national referendum elicited an 
ultimatum from EU leaders (on November 2). Papandreou decided to step aside to give way to a 
new unity government headed by Lucas Papademos, a former ECB vice president.  
The gloom in official circles about Greece’s incapacity to pay the bulk of its obligations falling 
due in 2012 and beyond became more pervasive with the realization that the economy was 
shrinking faster and deeper than anticipated, government revenues were falling short of target, 
and the public debt was growing more burdensome than expected. In late 2010, the IMF had 
forecast that Greece’s GDP would drop 3% in 2011, but by early 2012 it was clear that it had 
contracted nearly 7% and that it would keep shrinking in 2012 – as in fact it has done at that rate 
of decline. The unemployment rate had been expected to peak at 15% in 2012, up from 7.25% in 
mid-2008, yet it had reached nearly 21% already by the end of 2011. It would keep soaring to 
almost 25% during the third quarter of 2012. Government revenues had been anticipated to hit an 
all-time high of €97 billion in 2011, but by early 2012 it was evident that they had actually come 
in below the prior year, at €88 billion. The public debt was supposed to expand to no more than 
€347 billion in 2011, the equivalent of 152% of projected GDP. In the event, the year closed with 
the debt stock at €356 billion, representing 165% of a much-reduced GDP.24 
Negotiations with creditors resumed in February (2012) and a new debt relief plan was finally 
agreed on February 21, reportedly prompted by the impression conveyed to creditor 
representatives that the eurozone leadership might countenance a unilateral default on Greece’s 
part.25 Under the terms of the deal, investors were ‘invited’ to forgive 53.5% of what they were 
owed under 135 series of bonds, and to exchange 31.5% of their remaining principal for new, 
low-coupon Greek bonds with maturities of 11 to 30 years, and the rest (15%) for two-year notes 
issued by the EFSF.26 It was part of a new Troika program providing “a comprehensive blueprint 
for putting the public finances and the economy of Greece back on a sustainable footing and 
hence for safeguarding financial stability in Greece and in the euro area as a whole”.27 
The resulting debt relief was equivalent to about half of Greece’s 2011 GDP, and all-in NPV 
losses to investors were mostly estimated to have been between 70% and 75%, depending on the 
discount rate applied (9%–12%). The restructuring proposal was part and parcel of a €130 billion 
loan program that Europe and the IMF agreed to in return for a new round of Greek austerity and 
reform measures. Acceptances were requested by the close of business on March 8, but the 
                                                          
24 Projected figures for 2011 from IMF, “Greece: Second Review Under the Stand-By Arrangement”, December 6 2010, pp. 41-–
3; actual figures from Hellenic Statistical Authority, The Greek Economy, December 14 2012, pp. 11–33. 
25 “The Greek bailout appeared to hang in the balance when rumors circulated that Germany’s Finance Minister, Wolfgang 
Schäuble, was willing to contemplate a Greek default”. See Stephen Castle, “Europe Agrees on New Bailout to Help Greece 
Avoid Default”, New York Times, February 20 2012. 
26 Holdings of Greek Treasury bills were excluded. The coupon on the new bonds was set at 2% until February 2015, 3% for the 
following five years, and 4.3% until 2042. See IIF, “Press Release: Greek Debt Exchange”, February 28 2012. Creditors were also 
offered GDP-linked bonds that will pay interest if the economy grows by more than 2% per annum during 2020–41, and faster 
than 2.25–2.90% before that (depending on the specific year). The complete details were provided to investors in The Hellenic 
Republic’s Invitation Memorandum dated 24 February 2012. 
27 Eurogroup, “Eurogroup Statement”, February 21 2012. 
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deadline was later extended into April. In the end, €199 billion (the equivalent of about $263 
billion) worth of Greek government debt was written off and restructured, representing 96.9% of 
the €205.5 billion face amount of government debt held by private sector creditors – the target of 
the selective default.28 
The debt restructuring was billed as a “voluntary transaction” involving private sector holders of 
approximately €206 billion (face amount) of Greek government bonds.29 However, it was not to 
be really voluntary in various respects.  
• First, most of the bonds were held by Greek banks, or else by dozens of European banks 
and insurers, all of whom operate under the thumb of their respective government 
regulators—and most of whom have become dependent for funding on the ECB. 
Realistically, they had no choice but to participate. 
• Second, the Greek parliament hastily passed a law retroactively introducing ‘collective 
action clauses’ (CACs) into the €177 billion of targeted bonds governed by Greek law, 
specifying that by tendering into the exchange, every bond holder was automatically 
voting to make the terms of the exchange applicable to all other bonds.30 Therefore, once 
the consent of €152 billion of bonds representing almost 86% of holders was received, 
the terms of the remaining €25 billion were amended as if they too had consented. The 
introduction of CACs in sovereign bonds is no novelty, but to our knowledge has never 
happened retroactively—a clear violation of the sanctity of contracts. It is no wonder that 
the new bonds arising from the debt exchange are subject to English law; otherwise, their 
indentures would have no credibility. 
• Third, the Greek authorities made it plain that non-participants into the exchange should 
not expect any payments. At a March 5 meeting with investors in Frankfurt, the head of 
Greece’s Public Debt Management Agency stated that the country’s economic program 
“does not contemplate the availability of funds to make payments to private sector 
creditors that decline to participate.”31 
The message was presumably intended for investors in the €29 billion of bonds issued under 
foreign law, or by state-owned enterprises under government guarantees, whose terms could not 
be amended unilaterally. As of the first due date, €20 billion (69%) of these bonds were tendered 
into the exchange, since many of them already included CACs, but even after an extension, an 
untendered remainder of €5.5 billion worth of government or government-guaranteed bonds was 
left in the hands of holdout investors. Thus, the question arose as to what the Greek authorities 
would do: refuse to pay the holdouts, as Argentina has done for a dozen years now despite many 
                                                          
28 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, Press Release, April 25 2012. 
29 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, “PSI Launch Press Release”, February 21 2012. 
30 Under the Greek Bondholder Act (Law 4050/2012), if holders of at least 50% of outstanding Greek-law bond vote and two-
thirds of them are in favor of a proposed amendment— in this case, the debt exchange offer— it becomes binding on all bond 
holders. 
31 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, “Public Debt Management Agency Press Release”, March 6 2012. 
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court judgments ordering it to pay what it owes, or behave honorably and pay up. A first answer 
was provided on May 15, when Greece announced that it had made a €436 million bond payment 
to the hold-out investors who owned it. Two other such payments were due in September and 
December (2012), although for lesser amounts, and they are presumed to have been paid.32 
It is noteworthy that the €206 billion in government bonds subject to debt forgiveness and 
restructuring accounted for less than 60% of the Greek public debt, which as mentioned earlier 
totaled €356 billion as of end-2011. Treasury bills, which the authorities excluded in order not to 
taint this short-term segment of the market, represented a mere €15 billion of that. Loans from 
the European Union and the IMF accounted for €74 billion, and it is understandable that these 
creditors, who were providing new funding under debtor-in-possession circumstances—
especially the traditionally senior IMF – would likewise have been excluded. That left some €61 
billion that was potentially up for grabs.33 
However, most of that figure (an estimated €50 billion) involved ECB holdings of Greek 
government bonds purchased through the Securities Market Program (SMP), the ECB’s window 
to support the secondary market for eurozone sovereign bonds. The working assumption among 
many observers had been that the ECB, or possibly individual national central banks, would find 
a way to contribute to Greece’s debt-relief exercise by exchanging their existing bonds for new 
ones paying, for instance, lower interest rates.  
As it turned out, in mid-February the ECB did swap its stock of Greek government bonds for 
new ones—but it did so on identical terms (same face value and coupons) with a separate ISIN 
(International Securities Identification Number) from that of other Greek government bonds, 
thereby setting its holdings apart from and above all other bonds. The swap did not include 
bonds held by individual eurozone central banks. All that eurozone finance ministers 
subsequently agreed was that future profits made by the ECB from Greek government bonds 
would be distributed alongside other profits to eurozone governments, and that these “may be 
allocated by Member States to further improve the sustainability of Greece’s public debt.”34 
As Standard & Poor’s has pointed out, however, since the ECB’s newly-minted Greek 
government bonds were exempted from the retroactively applied CACs and were thus protected 
from any forced write-downs, the practical effect was that all other bond holders became 
                                                          
32 “What’s news is where most of that money went. Almost 90% was delivered to the coffers of Dart Management, a secretive 
investment fund based in the Cayman Islands, according to people with direct knowledge of the transaction. Dart is one of the 
best known of the so-called vulture funds, which have a track record of buying the distressed bonds of nearly bankrupt 
countries — and if they do not get paid, suing the governments for the money. Dart and another big vulture fund, Elliott 
Associates, perfected that strategy during the various Latin American debt crises in years past”. Landon Thomas Jr., “Bet on 
Greek Bonds Paid Off for ‘Vulture Fund’ “, New York Times, May 15 2012. On the bond redemptions scheduled for September 
13 and December 21 for €184 million and €250 million, respectively, see Zsolt Darvas, “The Greek Debt Trap: An Escape Plan”, 
Bruegel Policy Contribution, November 2012, p 15. 
33 Data from Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, “Public Debt Bulletin”, December 2011; and from IMF, “Greece: Request for 
Extended Arrangement under the Extended Fund Facility”, March 9 2012. 
34 Eurogroup, “Eurogroup Statement”, February 21 2012. 
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effectively subordinated to the ECB in terms of payment. “The ECB’s swap has established a 
new precedent by adding another class of superior creditor to the existing group comprised of the 
ESM [the upcoming European Stability Mechanism], the IMF, and other multilateral 
development banks. We believe that this development could further weaken the prospects of 
peripheral eurozone sovereigns currently receiving official funding to regain the ability to access 
the capital markets and could raise borrowing rates of those sovereigns still accessing the 
primary markets.”35 Moody’s concurred, because given that “the ECB holds a significant 
proportion of the outstanding debt of Greece, Ireland, and Portugal … the subordination of 
private sector creditors may make it more difficult to re-access the markets once their existing 
support programs run out in 2013.36 
Moreover, the European Investment Bank was also exempted from any haircut to principal or 
interest on its (relatively small) investment portfolio of Greek government bonds, thereby 
subordinating private bond holders just as the ECB had done – and likewise setting a precedent 
that will factor in the risk assessments made by private creditors.37 And yet, the EIB is a regional 
development bank – namely, an end-investor – and its holdings of Greek government bonds were 
not part of the eurozone’s emergency financing for Greece. Therefore, a number of private 
investors understandably complained about why the EIB’s portfolio was spared alongside the 
ECB’s when their respective roles as providers of financing for Greece were so different.38  
2. Critique 
2.1 Bank recapitalization 
It is notable that the extent of debt relief required of private creditors was a function of at least 
two judgment calls that certainly can be questioned. The first was the decision to recapitalize the 
Greek banking system with EU and IMF funds—and to do so very generously. This 
recapitalization became necessary largely because of the hit to Greek bank balance sheets from 
the punishing sovereign debt restructuring. For example, Greece’s four biggest banks reported a 
combined loss of €27.9 billion (nearly $37 billion) from having participated in the country’s debt 
exchange.39 The decision to recapitalize the banks with public funds increased the size of the 
official-sector loan package by €50 billion, and thus the extent of losses imposed on private 
creditors—to minimize the government burden of servicing all the new official debt the 
                                                          
35 Standard & Poor’s, “ECB Greek Bond Swap Results in Effective Subordination of Private Investors”, February 24 2012. 
36 Moody’s Investor Service, “Greek Bond Pact Confirms Seniority of Eurosystem’s Sovereign Debt Holdings”, February 27 2012. 
37 The EIB has confirmed to this author that Greek government bonds held as part of its treasury assets were exchanged for 
new bonds that are out of the scope of the PSI offer and that don’t include CACs in their documentation. Email message from 
EIB’s Investor Relations and Marketing Office, July 20 2012, available upon request. The financial terms of the new bonds are 
identical to the former ones. The exchange doesn’t generate any profit or loss in the bank’s accounts. 
38 John Glover and Esteban Duarte, “EIB Privileges in Greek Debt Plan Spur Complaints from Private Investors”, Bloomberg 
News, March 2 2012. 
39 Marcus Bensasson, Maria Petrakis and Natalie Weeks, “Greek Banks Post $37 Billion Losses on Debt Restructuring”, 
Bloomberg News, April 20 2012. 
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sovereign was taking on. The irony is that a less punishing restructuring would have reduced the 
hit taken by Greek banks, and thus the magnitude of the recapitalization bill. 
As a March 2012 IMF staff report freely admits, “a typical recapitalization program would see 
viable banks recapitalized using [Greek] government bonds (with perhaps some regulatory 
forbearance on capital ratios while problems are worked out) and the unwinding of unviable 
banks.” In the case of Greece, there was a political decision to depart from the customary “owing 
to the need to secure liquidity support from the Eurosystem, and to reassure regulators of Greek 
bank subsidiaries in neighboring jurisdictions.”40  
Moreover, it was decided that all bank deposits would be protected and so would all the senior 
unsecured creditors of Greek banks. This is a very expensive way to nurse an insolvent banking 
system back to health, and it yielded a stunning result: those who had bought bonds issued by 
Greek banks fared much better than those who had bought sovereign bonds—the inverse of the 
usual outcome. During the 2010 bailout of Irish banks (which had become victims of a property 
rather than a sovereign meltdown), the ECB had insisted that senior bond holders in bailed-out 
banks should not suffer losses, giving the Troika’s position on Greece a precedent. But the ECB 
would go on to change its mind not even six months later, when faced with the prospect of 
having to also rescue Spain and its banking system.  
At a July 9 meeting of eurozone finance ministers, ECB President Mario Draghi reportedly 
argued in favor of imposing losses on senior bank creditors in the case of Spain, especially if a 
bank had to be pushed into liquidation. The ministers initially rejected the ECB’s view out of 
concern that European financial markets would react badly, but the ECB’s shift became a sign 
that the tide was turning on the issue of how bank failures ought to be dealt with in the 
eurozone.41 Sure enough, by late August the government of Spain had approved a decree spelling 
out the terms of its support for banks (starting with the nationalized lender Bankia), and as part 
of the program investors in bank preference shares and subordinated debt will be forced to take 




                                                          
40 IMF, “Greece: Request for Extended Arrangement”, p 29. 
41 Gabriele Steinhauser and Brian Blackstone, “Europe’s Bank Shifts View on Bond Losses”, Wall Street Journal, July 15 2012. 
Senior bond holders did suffer major losses in the September 2008 failures of Lehman Brothers Holdings and Washington 
Mutual. Danish authorities forced write-downs on senior, unsecured bondholders when they shut down Amagerbanken and 
Fjordbank Mors in 2011. Gabriele Steinhauser, “Senior Creditors Rarely Get ‘Haircuts’ “, Wall Street Journal, July 15 2012. 
42 Miles Johnson, “Spain Gives Bankia Urgent Cash Boost”, The Financial Times, August 31 2012. “The memorandum of 
understanding on the terms of the bailout requested by Spain on June 9 says Spanish authorities will ‘require burden sharing 
measures from hybrid capital holders and subordinated debt holders in banks receiving public capital’ as part of efforts to 
minimize the cost to taxpayers of restructuring.” See Charles Penty and Esteban Duarte, “Spain Bank Bailout Means Forcing 
Losses on Cooks, Pensioners”, Bloomberg News, July 12 2012. 
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2.2 Debt sustainability 
The second judgment that is highly questionable is the decision to demand huge debt forgiveness 
from private creditors so that Greece’s debt burden may reach a ratio deemed to be ‘sustainable’ 
(defined arbitrarily at 120% of GDP) by a given date (set arbitrarily at 2020). The fact is that 
ratios of debt-to-GDP are reliable predictors neither of default probabilities nor of 
creditworthiness.43 Moreover, it is easy to make outsized mistakes when trying to forecast a ratio 
of debt-to-GDP during exceptional circumstances, and the IMF staff is notorious for its errors in 
forecasting such ratios and thus its failures to predict debt sustainability – or unsustainability.44  
Recent experience is instructive: in May 2010, the IMF staff projected that Greece’s public debt 
would reach €325 billion by the end of 2011—a year-and-a-half later—and that it would 
represent 145% of 2011 GDP. The staff’s estimate at the time of the default and restructuring 
decision, made public in March 2012, was that the stock of debt had reached €329 billion in 
2011, which was a very minor deviation from forecast, but that it had come to represent 165% of 
2011 GDP—a whopping difference. And the reason was a major underestimation of the 
contraction in GDP that took place in a very short a time, such that while the IMF’s forecast for 
the numerator proved quite accurate, that for the denominator was considerably off.45 
 
Figure 3: Ratio of Greek government gross debt-to-GDP (percentages as projected by IMF 
staff for 2010-11) 
 
Source: IMF and author’s calculations. 
                                                          
43 On the irrelevance of debt-GDP ratios for assessing the probability of default, see Paolo Manasse and Nouriel Roubini, “ 
‘Rules of Thumb’ for Sovereign Debt Crises”, Journal of International Economics, July 2009, pp. 192–205. On the irrelevance of 
debt-GDP ratios for the determination of creditworthiness by the credit-rating agencies, see Ricardo Hausmann, “Good Credit 
Ratios, Bad Credit Ratings: The Role of Debt Structure”, Rules-Based Fiscal Policy in Emerging Markets, ed. by George Kopits 
(New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), pp. 30–52. 
44 Charles Wyplosz, “Debt Sustainability Assessment: Mission Impossible”, Review of Economics and Institutions, Fall 2010. 




Within months of the supposedly successful March 2012 debt restructuring, in fact, the Troika 
began to doubt the debt sustainability projections behind the exercise, because the Greek 
economy continued to contract more sharply than expected in the May-September period.46 
Evidently, the massive losses imposed on private creditors, and equally impressive debt relief 
obtained by the government, had failed to spark a recovery of consumer and investor confidence 
– not even a rally in the newly issued Greek bonds, for that matter, which continued to trade at 
huge discounts to par.  
Starting in September, IMF Managing Director Christine Lagarde began putting pressure on 
European governments to provide some debt forgiveness or debt-service relief of their own to 
offset the deterioration in Greek fiscal solvency prospects. When Germany and other 
governments objected, she raised the ante by threatening that, unless something was done to 
reduce Greece’s debt burden, the IMF would not disburse additional funds to the country.47 An 
agreement on the matter was finally reached in late November, at which the eurozone 
governments consented to more lending for Greece, in part to enable it to buy back and retire 
bonds in private hands at the heavily discounted market prices. They also agreed to refinance 
past loans to Greece at longer maturities and lower interest rates, as well as to pass on to Greece 
the profits the ECB has made on the bonds it had purchased.48  
The debt buyback was officially announced on December 3, and it involved a solicitation of 
offers for an exchange of Greek government bonds (maturing in 2023-2042) for six-month notes 
to be issued by the EFSF, via a modified Dutch auction, targeted mainly at the bonds held by 
Greek banks and international hedge funds. While far less coercive than the March restructuring, 
Standard & Poor’s determined that the auction amounted to a selective default and Moody’s 
likewise began to refer to it as Greece’s second default. The reason was that since bond holders 
would be receiving a fraction of the value promised by the original securities, and the 
government and the ECB were leaning heavily on Greek banks (which held around €15 billion of 
the bonds) to tender into the exchange, the buyback had all the hallmarks of a distressed-debt 
operation.49 In the event, the auction was closed with offers for €31.9 billion being accepted at a 
cost of 34% of face value, in exchange for €11.3 billion of EFSF notes.50 This enabled the Greek 
government to retire almost €21 billion (equivalent to more than 10% of GDP) of obligations for 
a mere one-third of their redemption value upon maturity.  
                                                          
46 The October 2012 edition of the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) estimated that Greece’s GDP at constant prices would 
drop by a cumulative 21.7% between 2007 and 2013, whereas thirteen months earlier, the September 2011 edition of the WEO 
had projected a GDP fall of 10.8% on that same basis. IMF, World Economic Outlook Databases, October 2012 and September 
2011. 
47 “The need to speak truth to weakness,” The Economist, December 1 2012. 
48 Eurogroup, “Eurogroup Statement on Greece”, November 27 2012. 
49 “We define a [debt] restructuring to include buybacks as an alternative to a potential conventional default, in which the 
investor or counterparty stands to fare even worse, and which motivates (at least partially) the investor’s acceptance of such an 
offer,” Standard & Poor’s, “Greece Ratings Lowered to ‘SD’ (Selective Default)”, December 5 2012. See also Moody’s Investors 
Service, “Debt Sustainability Remains a Concern Following Greece’s Second Default”, December 14 2012. 
50 Hellenic Republic Ministry of Finance, “Hellenic Republic Announces Exchange Offer Transaction Results”, December 12 2012. 
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Just as the past several years demonstrated the futility of trying to forecast ratios of debt to GDP, 
and to rely on them to anticipate a sovereign’s debt sustainability, who is to say that Greece’s 
GDP could not bounce back vigorously once it finds a bottom, restoring its creditworthiness 
ahead of schedule? Once the country succeeds in breaking the vicious cycle of undermined 
investor confidence driving the need for ever more stringent fiscal austerity, which has kept 
depressing economic activity, the Greek economy could well deliver a surprise on the upside. 
The IMF’s own research into past experiences with large fiscal consolidation programs has 
shown that positive macroeconomic developments tend to accompany large fiscal adjustments, 
especially when initial economic conditions are exceptionally difficult—as in the case of Greece. 
GDP growth usually recovers sharply back to trend during the first two years of fiscal 
adjustment, driven by an improvement in private investment and gradual gains in consumption 
and the trade balance.51  
And yet, the IMF’s debt sustainability forecast for Greece, which justified the Troika’s demand 
for massive debt forgiveness on the part of private sector bond holders in February 2012, 
envisioned an anemic economic recovery in 2014 to 2017, with real GDP growth averaging less 
than 3% per annum. This was a decidedly pessimistic forecast to make for a country with a high 
probability of experiencing a meaningful rebound in future years following a GDP collapse of 
17.5% during 2009 to 2013 (as estimated by the IMF in early 2012)—a country with a track 
record of success as one of Europe’s fastest-growing economies during the pre-crisis period 2000 
to 2007.52 
3. Conclusion 
Greece is a country that until 2009 had learned to live – and had been allowed to live by its 
eurozone partners – with a relatively high level of public debt. Successive governments in 
Athens were able to count on a stable, predictable demand for their bonds, such that the public 
debt was characterized by very low coupons and exceptionally long maturities. Investor 
confidence started to erode in late 2009 and early 2010, yet once Greece was finally helped by its 
eurozone partners and the IMF in May 2010, the financial markets began to calm down. But 
then, all of a sudden, the rug was pulled from under bond investors by Chancellor Merkel’s 
insistence, starting in October 2010, that private creditors needed to ‘contribute’ to Greece’s 
bailout by making concessions affecting the expected return on their holdings. 
As the months passed, the threatening intra-European rhetoric escalated, rating-agency 
downgrades multiplied, and the specter of a potentially painful default started to loom ever- 
larger. Consequently, private sector demand for Greek government bonds evaporated during the 
course of 2011. Spurred on by the Troika, the authorities had to react to the lack of affordable 
financing by announcing ever harsher fiscal austerity measures. The confidence of Greek 
                                                          
51 George C. Tsibouris et al., “Experience with Large Fiscal Adjustments”, IMF Occasional Paper No. 246, 2006, p 19. 
52 IMF, “Greece: Request for Extended Arrangement”, p 93. Real GDP growth in Greece averaged nearly 4.2% per annum during 
2000–07, see Hellenic Statistical Authority, The Greek Economy, various issues. 
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households and businesses tanked, causing a retraction in consumption and investment spending. 
And the economy began spiraling down into what has since become the greatest depression in 
that country in nearly a century. In sum, it was Chancellor Merkel’s very public, hard line on 
Greece and its private creditors that paved the road for the eventual default which imposed 
outsized losses on investors—an outcome that could have been avoided, or at least minimized. 
What became the largest and one of the most punishing sovereign defaults in history was 
justified by IMF forecasts of debt unsustainability that are prone to large error, arrived at after a 
questionable decision to protect Greek bank creditors and depositors most generously. Along the 
way, private investors were subordinated to the ECB and its network of national central banks, as 
well as to the EIB, setting a precedent that would weigh on investors in other faltering countries 
around Europe’s periphery. Local law was rewritten in Greece with retroactive effect to facilitate 
the change in payment terms via the introduction of CACs—another troubling precedent, 
particularly because more than 97% of the outstanding bonds of Spain, Italy and Portugal are 
similarly governed by local law, such that these countries could also enact similar legislation to 
facilitate the imposition of large losses on their bond holders.53 
Greek government obligations in the hands of private investors were successfully restructured to 
give the sovereign an extraordinary amount of debt relief, but as of early 2013 the victory was 
looking Pyrrhic because of the seemingly enduring reputational and market damage done in the 
process. According to a June 2012 survey of major financial institutions that are primary dealers 
in debt issued by European governments, Greece may have to wait at least another five years 
before it can again sell bonds to investors: three of 20 respondents expected it to take at least a 
decade before Greece can place new debt again, ten said that investors would not purchase Greek 
bonds any sooner than 2017, while five predicted that it would be 2015 at the earliest.54 This 
suggests that the default and restructuring may have turned Greece into a ward of the ECB, EU 
and IMF for an extended period of time, a prospect reinforced by the fact that, after the 
distressed debt exchange in December 2012, more than 75% of the total stock of Greek 
government debt is held by these official creditors. And the sad turn of events in Greece has also 
scared investors away from bank and sovereign debt obligations issued in other European 
periphery markets, such as Cyprus, Italy, Portugal and Spain, thereby aggravating the eurozone’s 
financial woes.55 This is why the Greek default and debt restructuring of March 2012, and all the 
events that led up to it and then followed it, illustrate so vividly the many grave flaws inherent in 
                                                          
53 Moody’s Investors Service, “Unilateral Action Threatened by Greece is Also Available to Other Sovereigns”, February 6 2012. 
54 Anchalee Worrachate and Lukanyo Mnyanda, “Greece Seen Blocked From Debt Markets Until 2017”, Bloomberg News, June 
25 2012. 
55 In June 2012, Cyprus became the fifth of the eurozone’s 17 states to seek a financial lifeline from the Troika, while also 
attempting to obtain a large loan from Russia, claiming inability of the government to refinance its debt obligations at 
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the eurozone project—flaws that hopefully will inspire the institutional and other reforms needed 
to assure its viability and restore its credibility. 
